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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
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PlaintiffsIRespondents, ! Supreme Court No. 36705-2009 
I 
VS. 
WARREN YADON and ICIM I I 
YADON, I 
I 
APPELLANT WARREN YADON'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for Cassia County, Honorable Michael R. Crabtree, District Judge, 
presiding. 
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111. ARGUMENT 
A. APPELLANT WARREN YADON HEREBY WITHDRAWS HIS 
APPEAL OF THE DENIAL OF HIS MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
Appellant Warren Yadon, upon further review of the case law, hereby 
withdraws his appeal of the trial court's denial of his motion for suininay 
judgment. 
B. THE T N A L  COURT MISAPPLIED THE LAW AND IT'S 
FINDINGS WERE CLEAWY ERRONEOUS WITH REGARD TO 
THE IMPOSITION OF A RESULTING TRUST. 
As set forth in Appellant's initial briefing, the trial court failed to properly 
apply the elements of Resulting Trust, and therefore, erroneously found that a 
Resulting Trust should be imposed. The trial coui-t's priinary failure was in its 
ei-roneous rationale that the Kelleys have "paid the purchase price" for the 
Montgomery Farm, when in fact, the Yadons "paid the purchase price" at the time 
they secured a loan in their names and delivered the consideration to Doc 
Flanders. Appellant requests that this Court enter a legal finding that the ICelleys' 
actions in this case did not coilstitute payment of the purchase price, and reverse 
the trial court's decision. 
As Warren Yadon has previously pointed out, "Idaho law presumes that the 
holder of title to real property is the legal owner of that property." Hettinga v. 
Sybr.nrzdy, 126 Idaho 467, 469, 886 P.2d 772, 774 (1994); citing Russ Ballard & 
Fanzily Achievement Inst. v. Lava Hot Springs Resort, Inc., 97 Idaho 572,579,548 
P.2d 72, 79 (1976). The Idaho statute of frauds requires that "all interests in real 
property must be accomplished through a writing, signed by the party granting the 
interest or that party's agent." Idaho Code 5 9-503. 
In their brief, the Kelleys argue that there was clear and convincing 
evidence presented at trial that the Kelleys had "made all of the payments of 
principal and interest on the Co~nmons Contract, Flanders Contract, Northwest 
Farm Credit loan, and the D.L. Evans Bank loan that is now held by Rabo." See, 
Response Brief, pg. 9. However, in open contradiction of that statement, the 
Kelleys also argue that "if they [Kelleys] do not cornplete the payments then they 
do not get title as beneficiary of the Resulting Trust." See, Response Brief, pg. 
1 I. In effect, the Kelleys acknowledge that they have not paid the entire 
purchase price for the Montgoinery Fann, because there are still years of 
payments reinailling on the loan. It was an error for the trial court to find, as a 
matter of law, that the "purchase price" had been paid for the Montgomery Farm 
by the Kelleys, when there are still years of outstanding loan payments due. 
Under the Kelleys' theory, they would have to wait until the loan is repaid to see 
if they still qualify as having paid the purchase price. Until then, the property is 
owned by the Yadons. The Kelleys' theory of resulting trust is legally untenable, 
and this Court should enter a legal ruling that the purchase price for property was 
paid at closing when the Yadons provided the proceeds froin their loan to Doc 
Flanders. 
Next, the Kelleys argue that "a resulting trust exists in this case froin the 
time when Kelleys assigned their Option to Purchase the Montgomery Place to 
[Yadons]." See, Response Brief, pg. 10. This argument ignores the undisputed 
evidence that the Yadons assumed a $40,000.00, debt that the Kelleys owed to 
Doc Flanders in exchange for the Option to Purchase the Montgomery Place. 
That was when the "purchase price" was paid for the Option. The Kelleys argue 
that they "gave up option inoney paid" and gave up "the cost of improvelnents 
made" before the option was assigned, iinplying that they coiitributed to payment 
of the purchase price for the option. However, this asgunlent does nothing to 
effect the analysis of resulting trust. The Option to purchase was set to expire, 
and by his own testimony, George Kelley was not in a financial position to 
exercise the option. If he had not exercised the option he would have lost his 
"option llloney paid" and also "the improveinents" made to the fann during the 
time he leased it from Cominons Farms. He cannot now argue that his "sunk" 
costs contributed to payment of the purchase price under the resulting trust 
analysis. 
The Kelleys also argue that there was "absolutely no positive evidence 
offered by Warren Yadon that abrogates the imposition of a Resulting Trust" in 
this matter. See, Response Brief, pg. 10. First, as a matter of law, the standard 
of proof was not "absolutely no positive evidence". At trial, the burden of proof 
on the ICelleys was to de~nonstrate all elements of resulting trust by clear and 
co~lvi~lcing evidence. Second, Warren Yadon offered exhibits that demonstrated 
that the Yadons secured a loan in their names to procure the cash to pay the 
purchase price for the Montgomery Place to Doc Flanders. ' See, Plaintiffs' 
Exhibits, 8, 10, 13, 14 and 16. Warren Yadon also offered exhibits to demonstrate 
that on occasions the Yadons actually made the loan payments out of their line of 
credit or on their credit cards. See, Defendant's Exhibits, L, S, T, U, V, W and 
X. Warren Yadon testified that the Kelleys have never fully reimbursed the 
Yadons for the payments that they made on their personal lines of credit. Tr. Pg. 
I Even though most of the exhibits were numbered as "plaintiff's exhibit - " at trial, 
Warren Yadon was prepared to offer these documents as exhibits but stipulated to the admission 
of the exhibits during the Kelleys' presentation of ,evidence. However the trial court implied in 
its order that Warren Yadon did not offer any evidence in rebuttal to the Kelleys' evidence. 
This was an unfair interpretation of the procedure through which exhibits were entered into 
evidence at trial, because many of the "plaintiff's exhibits" were offered by Warren Yadon and 
support Warren Yadon's position, but were simply numbered as plaintiffs' exhibits. 
381, 11, 14-16. These three pieces of evidence constitute quite clear and 
convincing evidence that the Kelleys did not meet their burden of proof, even 
under their own flawed statement of the burden of proof. 
Interestingly, on the "purchase price issue," the Kelleys make the 
following admission -"It is argued that the loan was the payinent of the purchase 
price. That is true at the outset, but who paid or is paying the payinent on the 
loan? Kelleys are." See, Response Brief, pg. 14 (emphasis added). This 
argument is apparently a concession that the Yadons' act of paying the purchase 
price by way of loan proceeds "at the outset" in 1994, constituted the payinent of 
the purchase price. With that concession, this Court should overturn the district 
Court's decision. Based on this concession, the only remaining argunlent that the 
Kelleys have is that they have "incurred an absolute obligation" to re-pay the loan. 
However, incurring an obligation to repay a loan is NOT the same as "incurring 
an absolute obligation to pay the purchase price" for a piece of property in the first 
place. The distinction between the two is a critical matter of law, and this Court 
should clarify once and for all that repayment of a loan does not equate to 
payinent of the purchase price for a piece of property. 
Even if repaying a loan could be classified as "paying the purchase price", 
the Kelleys still have not incurred an "absolute obligation" to repay the loan in 
this matter. Comparing the parties, the Yadons incurred an absolute obligation to 
repay the D.L. Evans Loan, when they signed a promissory note and gave a deed 
of trust to the bank, and the Kelleys have only made a verbal promise to reimburse 
the loan payments to the Yadons. The only "obligated" persons on the loan to 
D.L. Evans banlt are the Yadons. There is no other reasonable interpretation of 
the term "absolute obligation," in general, and especially in the context of this 
case. To hold otherwise, would be to open the floodgates of litigation in the form 
of "resulting trust claims" froin renters, lessors, co-signors, guarantors, and others 
who have "agreed" either verbally or in writing to repay a portion of a loan - even 
if that agreement came in the forin of a lease. 
The Kelleys also argue that "lilt is a stretch to say that the loan proceeds 
paid the purchase price. If that were the case the loan company would own the 
property." See, Response Brief, pg. 14. The practical implication of this 
arguinent is simply preposterous. Every day of the week, lenders loan inoney to 
purchasers who use the proceeds of the loan to buy things. There is no legal 
authority for the argument that the lenders, therefore, own all of the things that are 
purchased from the loan proceeds. In reality, the lenders are selling inoney to the 
borrower in exchange for repayment of the inoney with interest. And of course, 
it goes without saying, that the borrowers own the property that is purchased with 
the loan proceeds. In real world terms, the Yadons own the Montgomery fann in 
fee simple, and D.L. Evans bank holds a deed of trust for the amount of the loan. 
The Kelleys then argue that "[ilf Yadons had paid the loan payinents or paid 
off the loan then this case may have had a different outcome." See, Response 
Brief, pg. 14. This is another revealing concession, in that the Kelleys concede 
that they have not yet met the requirements of their own flawed theory of resulting 
trust, i.e., they have not fully reimbursed the loan payments to the Yadons. 
Therefore, their claim must fail. Further, if the Kelleys' flawed theory of resulting 
trust is taken to its logical extreme, no one would own property until they liave 
made all of the payments on the loan (and under the Kelleys' theory the bank 
would own the property in the meantime). In this case it would be impossible for 
the Yadons to ever purchase the Montgomery Farm, unless they liave hundreds 
of thousands of dollars in cash lying around, because if they get another loan to 
pay off the D.L. Evans loan the Kelleys would likely still claim that they are 
making the new loan payinents because they are paying rent which happens to 
equal the loan payment. In sum, under the Kelleys' own theory of the case they 
have not yet paid the purchase price and so entry of an order of resulting trust by 
the trial court was premature and should be overturned. 
Finally, with regard to the "absolute obligation" to pay the purchase price, 
the ICelleys have really based their case on the argument that they verbally agreed 
to reimburse the loan payments and the evidence they proffered to prove that they 
have actually done that. This theory had to be proved by clear and convincing 
evidence at trial. However, the trial court was clearly erroneous in its factual 
finding that the Kelleys had reimbursed ALL of the loan payments. There was 
simply not "clear and convincing" evidence of those facts presented at trial. In 
their brief, the Kelleys argue that "there is no evidence in the record that they have 
not made all the payments or reimbursed Yadons for the few payments they inay 
have made." See, Response Brief, pg. 15. This argument is problematic on at 
least two fronts. First, the verbiage of the argument again implies a subtle burden 
shift to the Yadons to demonstrate that the Kelleys "have not made" all the 
payments, when in reality, the burden of proof was on the Kelleys. Such a burden 
shift was improper and reversible error. Second, as set forth herein, there was 
conflicting verbal testimony at trial regarding whether or not the loan 
reiinburseinents had all been made by the Kelleys. The Kelleys conceded that the 
Yadons had to put some loan payments on their personal lines of credit, and did 
not produce documentation to verify that they had reimbursed all of those loan 
payments. As such, it was error for the trial court to find that clear and convincing 
evidence of reimbursement existed. 
In an additionally troubling turn of events, in the "Judg~nent" entered on 
June 9, 2009, the trial court ordered that the Yadons are required to continue to 
hold the Montgo~nery Farm in their names, as trustees, until the D. L. Evans Bank 
note has been repaid by the Kelleys. R. Vo1.2, pg.405 and 407-408. By this 
order, the trial court has forced the Yadons to continue to act as "trustees " witlzout 
compensation of any kind, and in complete disregard for the principles of equity 
upon which the resulting trust was imposed in the first place. What if the Kelleys 
do not inalte a payment this spring? Where does that leave the Yadons? Is their 
personal credit to be destroyed, their collateral taken, their wages garnished, and 
their personal accounts exhausted in order to comply with this Court's order 
requiring them to act as trustees for the Kelleys? Are they to be saddled with this 
court imposed obligation for years to come without recourse? 
The imposition of a resulting trust only maltes s e ~ ~ s e  where a person 
claiming the trust, in this case the Kelleys, has actually paid the purchase price for 
the property at the time of the transaction. If that has occurred, and yet the 
property was titled in someone else's name, then it would be proper for a Court 
to impose a resulting trust to ensure that the beneficial interest obtained by 
payment of the purchase price could not be taken by the holder of legal title who 
has not paid the purchase price. Demonstration by clear and convincing evidence 
of payment of the purchase price by the person claiming imposition of the 
resulting trust is the linchpin of this equitable theory. In this case, the trial court 
clearly erred in iinposing a resulting trust, and should be overturned. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Warren Yadon requests that this Court find as a matter of law that the trial 
court misapplied the ele~nents of resulting trust, and hold that the evidence in this 
case supports entry a legal ruling that the Yadons paid the purchase price for the 
Montgomery Place. 
Dated this 1 day of March, 2010. 
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